What Gridinsoft observed on appswebstore.com
A Gridinsoft threat analyst reviewed the site directly and documented the evidence behind this decision.
GMA-20260825211826-b0d1e614
- Reviewed
- by Gridinsoft Threat Analyst
- Analyst finding
- Safe
- Evidence basis
- First-party site analysis External vendor intelligence: Contradictory context — not used for this decision
The independent current Gridinsoft-owned review did not reproduce phishing, malware delivery, credential theft, malicious redirection, or a specific harmful URL, file, payload, or receiver on appswebstore.com or its www destination. Account and wallet-secret inputs were intentional product functions; the checked current client code kept wallet material encrypted locally and did not transmit secrets in inspected network paths. Two external phishing results were broad blacklist labels without object-level evidence and did not control this verdict. Safe applies only to the reviewed current public scope.
Analyst findings
Review 7 documented observations View evidence
The apex consistently upgraded HTTP to HTTPS and then redirected to the corresponding www HTTPS homepage. The www homepage returned HTTP 200. Nine sampled user-agent and origin-IP profiles returned identical final homepage bytes, and no unrelated redirect or sampled cloaking difference was observed.
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Redirect destination
https://appswebstore.com/ -
Redirect destination
https://www.appswebstore.com/ -
HTTP status
200 -
Final URL
https://www.appswebstore.com/ - Analyst observation Browser, crawler, command-line, and six direct-origin-IP profiles produced the same final homepage content in the sampled review.
The current homepage identified Apps Web Store and AWE Wallet as crypto and web application tools. It linked same-brand account, wallet, swap, documentation, source-code, social, and Chrome Web Store resources. No iframe, automatic file delivery, unrelated navigation, or deceptive login overlay was found on the reviewed homepage.
- Page element Title: Apps Web Store (AWE) - Create Apps, Web3 Tools, AI & Crypto Platform
- Page element Navigation to Apps, Create App, AWE Wallet, Swap, API, Whitepaper, About, and Contact
- Analyst observation No iframe, automatic executable download, or unrelated redirect was identified on the reviewed homepage.
- Public artifact URL https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/awe-wallet/pocegdpjahidghlpengkhaiancfpnapn
- Public artifact URL https://github.com/appswebstoreawe
The linked login and registration pages contained ordinary same-origin account forms with anti-forgery tokens. The login requested email and password, while registration requested name, email, password, and confirmation. No wallet recovery phrase, private key, payment card, or unrelated receiving host was present in these account forms.
- Page element Login form posts to its same-origin route and contains an anti-forgery token, email, and password fields.
- Page element Registration form posts to its same-origin route and contains an anti-forgery token, name, email, password, and password-confirmation fields.
- Analyst observation No wallet secret, payment-card field, hidden unrelated receiver, or deceptive brand impersonation was identified in the reviewed account forms.
The linked web wallet and current Chrome Web Store package intentionally support creating or importing wallets. Static review found wallet material encrypted and stored locally in the browser. The inspected network-call paths covered public chain RPC, balances, prices, swap quotes, bridge data, transaction broadcasts, and affiliate metadata; no reviewed request serialized a recovery phrase or private key to a remote service.
- Page element The wallet UI explicitly describes creation and import using a recovery phrase, private key, or keystore.
- Analyst observation The current web-wallet bundle stores encrypted wallet records in browser local storage and performs signing locally.
- Analyst observation No inspected fetch or request body transmitted a recovery phrase, mnemonic, or private key.
- Analyst observation The current Chrome Web Store package limits automatic content-script injection to the publisher's declared domains; user-initiated active-tab access remains a security-sensitive permission.
The apex and www host resolved through Hostinger infrastructure. The current certificate was valid for both names, and direct requests to all sampled current and recently reported origin addresses preserved the same apex-to-www behavior and final homepage content.
- DNS fact appswebstore.com A 92.113.16.65 and 92.113.23.82
- DNS fact www.appswebstore.com CNAME www.appswebstore.com.cdn.hstgr.net
- Certificate fact Let's Encrypt certificate valid for appswebstore.com and www.appswebstore.com from 2026-07-26 through 2026-10-24
- Analyst observation Direct requests to six sampled current and recently reported IPv4 origins preserved the expected apex redirect and identical www homepage body.
Exact-host OSINT searches did not identify a concrete malicious URL or sample. URLScan had no direct apex or www scan; one unrelated scan referenced two image assets from the www host and had no classification. OTX reported zero pulses. Exact public sandbox searches produced no indexed sample-level result, and Wayback returned no archived HTML capture for the apex or www host.
- Public artifact URL https://urlscan.io/result/019f9858-7789-70cf-a6dd-2a689d527617
- Public artifact URL https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/appswebstore.com
- Analyst observation The URLScan result was for zbitco.com, carried no classification, and only loaded two image assets from www.appswebstore.com; it was not a scan of appswebstore.com and did not demonstrate harmful behavior.
- Analyst observation Exact public searches in ANY.RUN, Hybrid Analysis, Triage, URLhaus, and ThreatFox returned no indexed object for appswebstore.com or www.appswebstore.com.
- Analyst observation Wayback CDX returned no archived successful HTML snapshot for appswebstore.com or www.appswebstore.com.
The review covered the public apex, www homepage, linked account and wallet entry points, selected swap pages, current public wallet package, DNS, TLS, and public OSINT. It did not execute funded transactions, submit real credentials or wallet secrets, audit every subdomain or on-chain asset, or prove the behavior of future content.
- Analyst observation No real account credentials, recovery phrase, private key, or funded transaction was submitted during the review.
- Analyst observation Static code inspection is not a substitute for executing every authenticated, transactional, extension, backend, subdomain, or future path.
Scope and limitations
- The result applies to the current public apex, www destination, selected linked public flows, and reviewed wallet client at the recorded time; it does not certify every subdomain, backend, on-chain asset, authenticated action, or future change.
- No real credentials, wallet secret, funded swap, bridge, transaction, or extension signing request was submitted. Static review of the current package and web bundle cannot replace exhaustive runtime analysis of every transactional path.
- Public search, sandbox, threat-intelligence, URL-scanner, and archive indexes are incomplete. No matching public object means none was found in those sources, not that an undisclosed historical object could never have existed.
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